by Ivoni Richter Reimer
Sapphira: A Woman’s Story for Mourning, or:
The Deadly Guilt of the Co-Conspirator (5:1-11)
Preliminary Observations
This chapter is particularly concerned with the conditions underlying the concealment of part of the proceeds of the sale of a piece of land, and the meaning of this action done by Ananias with the knowledge of Sapphira. The question of Sapphira’s guilt within this game of greed must also be posed in this context. Since the story exists within the larger context of the community of goods practiced by the Christians of Jerusalem, I will attempt to understand it in that context.
The narrative in Acts 5:1-11 is strongly realistic, so much so that it still shocks its readers. To put it another way: it continues to express the terrifying power of sin and its consequences. It reminds us that the reign of God is still only a fragmentary and experimental reality. It attests that membership in the community of the saints is by itself no guarantee that we are fully delivered from the power of sin. Christians, too, are daily confronted with the temptations of pleonexia, the desire to acquire more and to secure themselves against the future. They are therefore called to constant resistance and solidarity. Thus Acts repeatedly refers to the first Christians as being “of one heart and soul,” in order to keep that memory alive and vivid for us. Because the power of sin threatens to destroy not only the individual, but the community, and does indeed destroy them if it is given sufficient scope, the narrative is intended to raise opposition to sin again and again by repeatedly arousing the audience’s fear of such a thing happening (vv. 5, 11). This is the fear of the divine, the deepest form of knowledge, a readiness to take God seriously in the very place where unjust human action causes death—for others and for oneself. This fear is also intended to make people take the dreadful power of sin seriously, because it is capable of anything and takes advantage of the tiniest crack in order to reveal its power. It is a mighty force that stops at nothing, but cannot spread itself without limit if it is resisted. When people work together with God, with their whole hearts and souls—and as a united force—the resistance can be effective. The element of “fear” is meant to encourage us to draw consequences from this story for our dealings with fellow human beings, including matters having to do with property, which exists in order to prevent the suffering of others. Ultimately that means also that we are to question ourselves anew: is it possible that we may, even unconsciously, be cooperating with the death-dealing power of sin? The story of Sapphira and Ananias invites us to a self-critical examination of our daily Christian lives.
Interpretation of the Text
First of all, we must inquire about the status of women with respect to Jewish customs of property rights within marriage, because Sapphira is mentioned, together with her husband, in the context of the sale of a piece of land. We need to know whether the concept of nosphizesthai, “to conceal,” has a negative connotation, and whether deception of the community is intended from the outset. In this connection, we must ask whether lying to the Holy Spirit and concealment are the same thing, or whether these are two different actions, independent of one another. We have to interpret v. 4 against the background of and in connection with Acts 2:42-47 and 4:32-37. For the whole pericope it is important to know whether and to what extent Sapphira’s statement in v. 8 is to be regarded as a lie. After clarifying these particular questions, I will attempt an interpretation of the pericope as a whole.
Women’s Property Rights in Marriage
To what extent was Sapphira actively involved in the sale of the property? What is the meaning of the assertion, in v. 1, that Ananias sold the field “together with” (syn) his wife, Sapphira? The fact that Sapphira was not a completely passive participant is stated expressly in v. 8: Peter determines that not only Ananias, but both partners sold the field. The two verses complement one another in determining the participation of the couple in the sale. I will trace this thread in the text by inquiring about women’s property rights within marriage under Jewish law. (1) Why does the text emphasize that Sapphira was involved? Could a husband not carry out the business by himself? Did he not have total control over the property, and could he not, as master, act alone?
This question is not addressed by the commentaries. It does not seem very important. We must seek outside the exegetical commentaries for an answer.
I received enormous help and guidance from the work of Elisabeth Koffmahn, (2) commenting on the duplicate documents discovered in Wadi Murabba’at in 1952, which afford us a deep insight into Jewish law as it affected private life. These duplicate documents are papyri on which the same text is written twice, one version beneath the other, so that “a space about two to three centimeters wide is left between the two texts; the upper writing was then rolled up, tied with papyrus threads drawn through a slit or several holes in the middle of the space, and sealed, while the lower text was simply folded together in order that it might be easily read at a later time.” (3) This was the fundamental concept of the duplicate document, which was always signed by at least two witnesses in addition to the parties involved. It was common practice in Judaism, not only in the Egyptian diaspora, for example, but also and especially in the Palestinian homeland. This was especially, though not exclusively, the case in the first two centuries C.E. because this form of legal documentation always flourished in periods when “an official location for the attestation and preservation of documents was no longer accessible.” (4) Such a situation occurred repeatedly in times of war and persecution, which visited Palestine more sharply than ever in the first two Christian centuries. Thus the duplicate documents constitute a central sign of Jewish resistance to Roman rule, even in the sphere of private life. (5)
We find traces of every kind of business in these duplicate documents: contracts for the purchase and sale of slaves, horses, real property and other things; loan contracts, marriage contracts and agreements, divorce documents, promissory notes, and so on. In short, we find all the forms of business dealings within the sphere of Jewish private life attested by duplicate documents. They afford us complete access to these matters.
Of special interest to us in this connection is the group of documents touching property rights within Jewish marriages, with which I want to deal in detail. At the time of marriage, contractual obligations were established affecting a variety of strata of property. (The marriage contract was called kethuba, but the same word also refers to a particular category of property included.) Let me quote Elisabeth Koffmahn’s summary:
… in the Jewish law of property rights in marriage the following types of property were distinguished . . . :
- Kethuba [in the narrow sense]: the share of the husband’s property that was to be transferred to the wife if the marriage was dissolved, and for which the husband’s whole property was obligated ex lege;
- Mohar: the bride price, that is, the sum that the bridegroom must give to his wife’s father or her family when the marriage was consummated; this, however, is attested only in biblical times;
- Dowry: Hellenistic in origin, this was conveyed by the bride’s father to the possession of the husband, but it remained the property of the wife. The dowry corresponded to the phernê in Greek law: the wife’s property was protected and, on the dissolution of the marriage, must be conveyed in natura (or according to value?) to the wife; here again, the husband was responsible with his whole property for this sum;
- Outfit: clothing, jewelry and personal effects that the bride’s father was required to give her when she married, corresponding to the parapherna in Greek law. The wife was the owner of these goods, and her husband had only the right of use.
- Bridal gifts : given by the bridegroom to the bride. She had exclusive right to use these and they were her own property. (6)
This author clearly emphasizes that, on the one hand, these five categories of property were not necessarily included in every marriage contract or kethuba (in the broader sense of the word), but on the other hand, by Talmudic law, every wife, whether rich or poor, had to have a kethuba in which the “marriage total” was stated: the amount that, in case the marriage was dissolved, would guarantee the wife at least the minimum necessary to sustain her existence. (7) We must therefore distinguish among the five categories of property listed by Koffmahn.
Thus, for example, the dowry the wife brought with her into marriage, which was derived from her father’s property, must be distinguished from the kethuba (in the narrow sense), which was drawn from the husband’s property. (8) We can observe from other documents that this law of marital property was actually practiced. (9)
The marriage contract was assurance for the wife that, if the marriage dissolved, her husband was responsible with his whole property for carrying out the terms of the kethuba. Hence, with respect to Acts 5: l ff., we must give attention to the question of the sale of real property. It would appear that, ordinarily, a woman did not bring real estate with her when she married. If she did, (10) her husband only had the right to administer the property, and not to sell it without the consent of his wife. (11)
Contracts for the sale of real property appear to have been made in writing in most cases. (12) I will cite three duplicate documents that seem important in the present context: Mur 26, 29, and 30. (13) These are contracts for the sale of land, all of them also signed by women, i.e., wives, as co-sellers. Mur 26 (first century c.e.) is fragmentary, with only the end of the contract preserved. A woman signs as co-seller. The property was apparently hers. In Mur 29 (14) (134 C.E.) we read, alongside the signature of the wife, “Safirah, daughter of Jeshua, on her own account, has call [ed for] the documents.” It is also signed by three witnesses. The wife’s witnesses are not the same as the husband’s. This could be a sign that the wife was probably not compelled by her husband to sign. Mur 30 (135 c.e.) is a very well-preserved document. It contains the names of the buyer and seller, the location of the land, together with house, trees, and plants, the sale price, the declaration of payment, and the signatures of the parties and their witnesses. The situation of the wife is also described in great detail in lines 26 ff.: “And I, Salome, the wife of this Dosthes, the daughter of Choni, son of Jehonathan, surrender this (property) sold on condition that I receive 30 (denarii) each year after (your death) . . . (and am allowed to remain) in your house, my husband.” (15)
Thus we have documentary evidence that a wife had rights over property held within marriage, in this case a piece of land, and that she surrendered these rights only in return for compensation: here, the husband was obliged to be responsible for housing her and to guarantee her, by bequest, thirty denarii per year in case of his death. Both the transaction and its documentation took place in Jerusalem.
This document offers us the following important insight into the story of Sapphira and Ananias: “The signature of the wife appears to have been necessary, even though she was not a contracting party or seller, for the sale contracts regarding these properties (i.e., Mur 29 and 30); both involved the disposal of a piece of land or a dwelling in which the wife had a material claim at law. Since … the husband’s whole property was obligated for the payment of the wife’s kethuba if the marriage was dissolved, the wife’s signature was necessary to insure that the object sold was free of obligation. She thus relinquished a security for her kethuba to which she was entitled.” (16) We may add: supposing that she demanded no conditions of her husband regarding the sale of the property.
Acts 5:1 clearly states that a piece of land was sold by Ananias “with his wife Sapphira.” The mention of Sapphira in this connection can only indicate that Ananias required Sapphira’s consent to the sale, because the land apparently served as security for her kethuba. Thus Sapphira’s consent is a precondition for the sale. By this transaction she relinquished the security for her kethuba. In surrendering this part of her marital right, Sapphira had abandoned some future financial security, even though it may not have been especially significant. But why did she support her husband in his act of concealment? Did she hope somehow, in this way, to retrieve her kethuba from the sum concealed, by helping her husband to retain part of the property? Did she have any opportunity at all to obtain an advantage from this concealment, inasmuch as, after consenting to the sale, she could no longer make any claim to her rights?
The Accusation: Betraying the Community of the Saints
Is Lying to the Holy Spirit
The assertion that Ananias, with the knowledge of Sapphira, had concealed part of the proceeds of the land that was sold is, in my opinion, of central importance in light of the community of goods. It illustrates the temptations, dangers, and evasions in the use of common property that must have been very much present at all times, and are so even now, and it gives them a theological interpretation.
First it is “neutrally” asserted in v. 2 that Ananias, Sapphira’s husband, kept back nosphizethai part of the money from the sale of the field. The action is then described and interpreted by Peter in v. 3. The concealment is thus theologized. In this way, monetary dealings and theological confession are placed or kept in close relationship. I think it is important in this context to attempt to explore in more detail the meaning of this concealment, its preconditions, and all the factors that may have entered into it. The concept of nosphizethai “keeping back,” is used only three times in the New Testament and twice in the LXX: Acts 5:2, 3 and Titus 2:10 (“pilfer”); Josh. 7:1 (“take”); 2 Macc. 4:32 (“steal”). It also appears a few times outside the biblical text, as described below. I will look first at these instances, and then apply the insights thus gained to clarifying the actions of Ananias and Sapphira.
The word nosphizethai is used in the LXX translation of Josh. 7:1 to describe Achan’s taking the “devoted things.” According to v. 21 these were items of booty taken in war: Achan had taken a beautiful Babylonian mantle, two hundred shekels of silver and a bar of gold weighing fifty shekels, all of which he buried under his tent. This was understood as “sin” or “transgression” (7:11) because everything (silver, gold, copper and iron utensils) was sacred to the Lord (6:19). Achan was punished with death. (17) According to Lev. 27:28-29, every offense against something dedicated to God is punishable by death.
We find the same significance in 2 Macc. 4:32. Here it is a matter of the theft of golden objects from the Temple treasury by the high priest Menelaus. Some of them he gave to Andronicus, the king’s deputy, and others he sold. This passage occurs in the context of a far-reaching power conspiracy in which corruption plays a considerable role. Menelaus first comes to power as a result of this corruption, and he remains high priest for some time afterward (4:50). Only at 13:1-8 do we get an account of his disgraceful death in the wake of the unrest caused by Menelaus since the time when he stole the Temple treasure. Here again there is a clear statement that the theft of objects dedicated to YHWH results in death.
Josephus uses the concept of nosphizethai in interpreting Deut. 22:1, (18) as a description of the secret retention of “the property of another” (allotria). He applies both concepts to a flock that has gone astray and that someone finds by accident. If the owner of the flock is not found, the one who discovered it is to keep it, but at the same time the finder should call on God to witness that he or she is not keeping the flock as his or her own property, but is only watching over it.
Polybius uses the concept of nosphizethai in the following context: the Roman army is making war on Spanish Carthage and captures it. In this connection, Polybius describes Roman procedure on taking possession of a city. Half of the soldiers plunder it, and the other half guard them while they do it. The war tribunal then divides the booty equally among all the soldiers and military officials. An oath sworn by all the soldiers is supposed to prevent them from secretly retaining part of the booty for themselves. The booty is declared to be the common property of the army, belonging equally to all: “. . . that no one is to keep back (nosphizethai) any of the booty, but must observe fidelity (19) to the oath that all swear when they first assemble in camp before the battle—of this we have already . . . spoken above.”(20)
A similar situation to that described by Polybius is found in Xenophon, who asserts that there is a great deal ofchrêmata in the camp, which may not be appropriated (nosphizethai) because it is common property (koina).(21)
In the fifth chapter of his History, Diodorus Siculus also describes the life of the Celtiberians. In speaking of the customs of the Vaccaei, in section 34, he says: “For this people each year divides among its members the land which it tills and making the fruits the property of all they measure out his portion to each . . . , and for any cultivators who have appropriated (nosphizethai.) some part for themselves they have set the penalty as death.” (22)
The decree of Calaurea (23) from the third century C.E. attests to a sacrificial gift for the temple of Poseidon: the interest on a sum of money lent, and a piece of land. Interestingly, it states that the sacrifice was presented as written in the “stelae,” or tables. The whole matter was then completed with a contract (spondê) solemnly concluded with a drink offering; nothing of the sacrificial gift may be kept back ( nosphizethai). Supervision is assigned to the (state or temple) officials.
Aristides, in his Apology, gives a report to the emperor on the lives of Christians. It says, among other things, that they “do not practice adultery and immorality, give no false witness, keep back (nosphizethai) no goods on deposit (chrêmata), and do not covet what is not their own.” (24)
After a review of these texts, it appears to me that a conclusion per negationem is already appropriate at this point: the concept of nosphizethai is not used as synonymous with , kleptô “steal,” “seize with cunning, unnoticed,” (25) or with harpazô, “rob,” “take something forcefully.” (26) Harpazô is used to describe a violent robbery or kidnapping (cf. Matt. 12:29; 13:19; Acts 23:10; 1 Cor. 6:10; Rev. 12:5, etc.). Kleptô also means stealing or breaking in, but it need not be violent (cf. Matt. 6:19-20; 19:18; 24:43; Luke 12:33; John 10:1, 10; 1 Cor. 6:10; Rev. 3:3, etc.). The actions of “stealing” and “robbing” are committed by outsiders who break in, usually with violence. “Keeping back” or “pilfering” is something different: it is done by “insiders,” secretly and without violence.
We may here state two connected insights that aid our understanding of nosphizethai and are derived from the texts considered above. They also help us to understand Acts 5:1-11. First, the concept of nosphizethai is not applied to describe an action I do to my own property. We find no report that someone has kept back a property (or part of one) that was his or her own. The keeping back occurs only when the property does not belong, or no longer belongs, to oneself. The passage cited from Diodorus Siculus makes clear that even the declaration that something of my own is now common property is a sign that I no longer have control over it. The control passes to those on whose behalf the common property exists. This brings us to the second insight: that the action of keeping back is directed against the common property that exists also for my sake, or that belongs to a community of which I am a member. The keeping back injures the community. Describing an action as “keeping back” or “pilfering” presumes that, before this, community decisions have been made that govern property relationships, and that people within the community have acknowledged a clear set of rights and obligations. Clear, common, for the most part even contractual relationships or those governed by and agreed upon through an oath are the preconditions for an act of keeping back something. Before one entertains the idea of keeping something back, one is already aware of the consequences: this is a punishable act.
This insight into a practice of that period with regard to community property throws light on the text of Acts. The story begins with a report that Ananias and his wife, Sapphira, had sold a field. According to Jewish marital property law, Ananias needed the consent of Sapphira, since a husband was responsible, with all his possessions, for the wife’s kethuba. After selling the field, he kept back part of the proceeds. His wife knew of his deed. Then he took part (the text does not say whether it was the larger or the smaller portion, and this is no longer important) and laid it at the feet of the apostles. With this action, he ritually surrendered control over the property to the community. Three distinct actions are described: the sale, the concealment of part of the proceeds, and the handing over of the remainder. I have already indicated that holding back is an action that can only be done with respect to community property or the property of another, not with respect to one’s own property. Ananias and Sapphira must have known already, when they sold the field, that the proceeds were to be placed at the disposal of the community. It appears that even before the sale common decisions had been made, although the text does not mention them, perhaps because that would be superfluous. It seems to me that it is appropriate, in light of v. 4, to inquire about the “community of goods” in Jerusalem, so as not to read the story of Sapphira and Ananias in isolation. But first we must look at v. 3, which can also help us to interpret this punishable action.
The text attests that a “holding back” can only occur when a person is not wholeheartedly committed to something and does not put her or his whole effort into it. In v. 3, Peter gives a theological interpretation of the concealment: Satan has filled the heart of Ananias. The question of why Satan has filled his heart is illuminated by other texts (27) and by the larger context. The New Testament concept of the “heart” corresponds to that in the Old Testament. The heart is not only “the central organ of the body, and the seat of physical vitality,” (28) but also “the center of the inner life of [the human being],” from which feelings and decisions arise. Thus the heart is also the “seat of understanding, the source of thought and reflection” and the “seat of the will, the source of resolves.” This concept of the heart is part of biblical anthropology. Here it is theologized on the one hand, and on the other hand is applied as an ecclesiological image. Thus the Jerusalem community’s self-definition as being of one heart (4:32) means nothing less than that different people have decided to follow the way of God together and, in doing so, to make their decisions in common as well. Being “of one mind,” “one heart and one soul” was an existential question for the primitive community. The fact that Satan had found lodging in one of them signaled that the community was not, after all, one in heart. The existence of the community is in danger. Satan can only fill someone’s heart if there is room for him there. The door that permitted entry to Satan was the door of money and greed. I agree with Rudolf Pesch at this point: “The reason why the Satan . . . could fill the heart of Ananias and make it an instrument of an evil plan … is obvious: because Ananias had not surrendered his whole heart to God (and God’s people, the community), but devoted part of it to mammon.” (29)
According to the text this business of “being filled by Satan” is the reason for lying to the Holy Spirit, which is concretely realized in the carrying out of the concealment. The identification of the two statements—concealment or holding back and lying to the Holy Spirit—is possible if we understand the kai in v. 3 epexegetically. Its function is thus explanatory: lying to the Holy Ghost consists, namely, in Ananias’s having kept back part of the proceeds. (30) The concealment is the outward expression of the lie that Ananias had planned in his heart. The betrayal of the community corresponds to the lie offered to the Holy Spirit. Luke T. Johnson comes to a similar conclusion, even though he emphasizes that it is not the community but the Spirit of God who is threatened by the conspiracy to conceal. (31) In my opinion, as already shown, the text maintains a close association between both these spheres of influence.
This interpretation is further strengthened by the use of the word pragma in v. 4b. Ananias has planned and determined this “deed” of holding back in his heart. Acts 5:4; 2 Cor. 7:11; and Jas. 3:16 attest to the judgment implied by this word: it refers to deeds or circumstances that are connected with evil intentions and bad consequences. (32) Ultimately, this action represents lying to God. The ecclesiological interpretation is therefore aligned in the most intimate fashion with the pneumatological and theological understanding. Betrayal of the community corresponds to a lie given to the Holy Spirit, that is, to God. Wounding the integrity of a community presumes a break between the human being and the divine.
In summary: the concept of nosphizethai indicates the possibility of corruption within a human grouping in which it is fundamentally impossible that there should be corruption, because no one in the group is to be at a disadvantage. It shows that even in optimally functioning groups, there are always people who are not completely free of pleonexia the desire to have more, and the idea that they should always keep something for themselves in reserve. This thought contemplates the possibility of the collapse of the community and looks to securing a future for itself after that collapse. Holding back is an internal offense from two points of view: economically, and in regard to trust. It is an offense against a necessity of life: the survival of the community. The concealment itself signals a division within the person who does it: she or he has one foot inside and the other outside, and is not wholeheartedly committed. Such people do not have complete confidence in the cause and do not risk everything on the project, the system of solidarity in the community. And those who do not trust will not commit themselves completely to the cause. Their divided hearts will come to terms with a double life. In the course of this attempt, ecclesiological and pneumatological offenses appear; here they manifest themselves on the economic level. The dividedness of one or two persons means that the community is no longer “of one mind.” This mutual effect is also expressed by the concealment.
Disregard for a Choice Freely Made
Ananias’s action—keeping back a portion of the proceeds of the sale, with the complicity of Sapphira—presumes an obligation toward the community that must have been agreed upon before the sale, since such an act can only be done with respect to community goods or the property of another. It must have been decided in the Jerusalem community, even before the sale of any goods, both that the proceeds would be transferred to the control of the community and what would be done with them.
In the tradition of interpretation of this passage it is repeatedly emphasized that v. 4 contradicts, or at least is in tension with Acts 2:42-47 and 4:32-37. (33) I will attempt to determine whether this interpretation can be maintained in light of v. 4. In fact, Acts 5:4 emphasizes that neither the sale nor the concealment connected with it needed to happen: “While [the field] remained unsold, did it not remain your own? And after it was sold, were not the proceeds at your disposal?” To begin with, Ananias was not compelled to sell the field. In the second place, he need not have divested himself of the proceeds of the sale. Third, if he had done neither, he would not have committed the act of concealment for which punishment is required.
I think that in light of v. 4 we can look back at 2:42-47 and 4:32-37 and obtain a more precise and differentiated picture of the “community of goods” at Jerusalem. The reports continually emphasize the unanimity of the saints: They were of one heart and soul; they were one. This is the precondition for their doing and owning everything in common (2:44; 4:32). No one had to say: “this is mine,” because everyone was taken under the protection of the community in which everything belonged to everyone. Therefore no one suffered want, for as it was necessary, some of the things that had been declared to be the property of the community were sold and the proceeds were distributed to all according to need. (34) Our texts from Acts unfortunately do not tell us how this sale process was carried out. They are also silent about the way in which the decision to sell something was made and who made it, and whose turn it was to sell the property that had been assigned to the community. I propose the following scenario:
Everyone who entered the community was aware, in case she or he had any property, that this would be declared the property of the community and, if necessary, would have to be sold. The necessity of the sale was conditioned on what the members needed for survival. No long-term planning was possible. Every new member agreed to be ready at a moment’s notice to relinquish the property declared to belong to the community by putting it up for sale, in order that the community, which was a genuine unity, might survive. I can also easily imagine that the decision about whose turn it was to sell something in any given situation was made in some kind of general assembly. We cannot completely exclude the possibility of a casting of lots in such a situation, since that system had been used in the community (see 1:26). But it is not so important to know how the decision was made. More important, it seems to me, is that it was probably not an individual decision, but that all the members took part—not least because of the importance of their unanimity.
In this reading we need not make Barnabas (4:36) a hero, nor must we see Ananias as nothing but an approval-seeking imitator of Barnabas. That kind of interpretation focuses on the praise that is supposed to have accrued to individuals in the community for having heroically sold their property. I suppose instead that the possibility of sale was accepted from the beginning, upon entry into the community; such a sale was not a heroic deed, but the consequence of a decision to enter wholeheartedly into this community in order that it might continue to be “one heart and one soul.”
From this point of view I also see that Ananias and Sapphira’s sale of the field was understood from the beginning within the context of things that might become necessary. The community decided that the time had come for Ananias and Sapphira to relinquish the field that they had declared to be part of the community’s property and to lay the whole proceeds at the feet of the apostles, in accordance with community norms (Acts 4:35, 37). They were aware that this could happen; they simply did not know when it might be.
I agree with Rudolf Pesch’s interpretation of v. 4: “Peter’s argument is presented in two rhetorical questions that recall something that is taken for granted. There is a reminder of the norms that are in force. That the sale of property rests entirely on free decision is as clear as that only those who are of one heart and soul (and one ‘body’) with the community of believers can regard nothing as private, but see everything as existing for the common use.” (35) Let me simply add, most emphatically, that this free decision had already been made upon entry into the community. And I do not know whether, for those who were one in heart and soul, there could even have been an idea of not selling what had been declared to be communal property, if the survival of the community, as one, depended on it. If any were not wholeheartedly committed in this way, it would seem that their more probable course of action would have been to leave the community. (36) Perhaps Peter’s words indicate that Ananias should not have entered the community of the saints in the first place, if he wanted to keep the field or its proceeds for himself. If, de facto, he wanted to hold on to them, the statement in v. 4a appears to contradict, or to represent a development beyond, what is said in 4:32, that “no one claimed private ownership of any possessions, but everything they owned was held in common.” It appears to me that, according to this statement, those who entered the community surrendered all claim to their property at that very moment. Property owners declared their goods to be the property of the community, but probably they continued to be legally responsible for them. That would mean that not just anyone within the community would sell something; this was the responsibility of those to whom the property still legally, though no longer factually, belonged. Business dealings must still have been the legal responsibility of private individuals, but they were done for the sake of the community. And v. 4b can be understood in precisely this sense: legally, Ananias may have had the disposition of the money in his own control, but not before God, since he had entered into God’s holy community in which all the wealth had been declared to be the property of the community. Therefore the concealment is an offense against the community and at the same time a lie told to the Holy Spirit. Hence we must maintain that Acts 5:4 (in its context) does not contradict the “community of goods,” but is instead to be understood precisely as a “proof that there was a community of goods.” (37) The freedom of decision referred to in v. 4 thus consists primarily in the decision to belong unambiguously to this community, or not. In any case, it is not desirable to take part with a divided heart and thus to attempt to serve several masters at the same time (Luke 16:13). Ananias and Sapphira, rather than leaving the community or not entering it in the first place, remained members, but only with divided hearts. Hence Satan found room in their hearts, since they were not completely committed. Satan, rather than the Holy Spirit, ultimately filled the heart of Ananias.
Co-Conspirator, One with Her Husband,
and Therefore Co-Actor
Sapphira was complicit in the concealment practiced by her husband. Her guilt began with her knowledge of what he was doing. The text speaks of mutual knowledge and agreement when it refers to Sapphira (v. 2) or when she is directly addressed (v. 9). In the view of the New Testament—within a patriarchal society—this shared knowledge is unique to the woman, especially since the verb in this form (suneiduiês, “having-knowledge-with,” the feminine participle of synoida) is a hapax legomenon, being used only here. This nuance of meaning already points to a patriarchal social structure. Sapphira is mentioned only in connection with her husband and the pursuit of his perverse plan.
According to the text (vv. 2-4), the keeping back of part of the proceeds was planned and carried out by Ananias. It is said of his heart, not that of Sapphira, that Satan has filled it. But what does it mean that Sapphira has played along with this and supported her husband with her shared knowledge? Does it not mean that she, too, had a divided heart with respect to the community? Was it not ultimately more important to her to support her husband in his unjust and deceitful action by keeping silence? With this action, which arises out of her shared knowledge, she accedes to the violence of a patriarchal marriage that in fact was already overcome, or should have been overcome, within the community of the saints. (38) Such guilty shared knowledge can only exist in the presence of degenerate structures of power; that is, it presupposes, for example, a patriarchal marriage structure. I understand the structure of patriarchal marriage to be the exercise within marriage of power that is not equal, but hierarchical in its form and use. We see it illustrated here in that the man both plans and carries out the actions: his heart, the seat of decision and will, was filled by Satan. But the wife conspires with him in carrying out the planned injustice. They have agreed with one another to test the Spirit of the Lord in this matter. The question is why Sapphira consented and obeyed. One possible answer is that she also had a divided heart, did not wholly trust the community, and could not or would not withdraw from the control of patriarchal power. But she surely would have had nothing to fear in the community of equals if she had resisted her husband in this matter. Her guilt consists in having supported her husband in his decision to conceal part of the proceeds of the sale; in doing so, she withdrew from the system of solidarity within the community, if she had ever been a part of it to begin with. The tragedy of Sapphira’s story is clear from the following question: what did she expect to gain from her shared knowledge, which ultimately made her a cooperator in the action as well? (39) What interest did she have in retaining a part of the proceeds of the sale of some of the marital property if, in consenting to the sale (as we saw above in the discussion of women’s property rights in marriage), she had already relinquished her marital property rights? This legally sanctioned relinquishment, supported by her consent, would have denied her, as a widow, any share in the money secretly kept back. Thus she is a sharer of knowledge and a co-actor without being able to profit directly from the business. Sapphira, in consenting to her husband’s corrupt and greedy plan, played along with and cemented the rules of patriarchy that reduce women to immature beings and make them incapable of resistance to the injustice that is often planned within their houses.
Sapphira is not less guilty in the whole business than Ananias (see pp. 16-23 below) because she did not directly plan and carry out the concealment. As one who shared knowledge of the deed, she is responsible for it. Her knowledge does not excuse her; rather, it makes her guilty. Shared knowledge is an active deed insofar as Sapphira undertook nothing against her husband’s plan and its accomplishment. That is her guilt: by failing to take counteraction, she became a partner in the deed. To withdraw from countermeasures, or not even to consider them, means letting evil reign. For that very reason, Peter accuses her in v. 9. In his accusation it is again clear that Ananias and Sapphira had agreed about the concealment. Being in agreement presumes, if not a formal contract or decision, at least a preliminary discussion (see Matt. 20:2, 13).
Sapphira is not playing some harmless game. Complicit knowers always allow themselves to be involved in situations that are very dangerous to themselves as well as to others. They, too, are called to account by history. Acts 5:1-11 does not differentiate between the actual deed of Ananias, and Sapphira’s knowledge of the deed. There is no qualitative difference between them. Unresisting knowledge is cooperation in the action itself. It participates, even if only passively, in the commission of the sin. It cooperates in the creation and preservation of injustice. This story of Sapphira teaches us that one cannot simultaneously participate in sinful actions and enjoy membership in the community of the saints without further consequences. According to Luke 16:13 this means that women and men cannot simultaneously serve two realms ruled by different powers, nor can they enjoy membership in both at one and the same time.
The Deadly Power of Sin’s Reign of Terror.
Confronting the Traditional Interpretations
In this section I will inquire particularly about the consequences of Ananias and Sapphira’s sin, and investigate whether liberating power for women can be derived from this story, or at least from its obverse. But first let me make some remarks about the form-critical discussion that is part of the history of the interpretation of this text.
A number of commentators designate this narrative a “legend of miraculous punishment,” (40) seeing as its possible historical core either an excommunication (41) or the death of a married couple. (42) Others consider it a “cautionary tale,” (43) whose Sitz im Leben is to be sought in a catechetical framework. It is difficult to choose one of these interpretations. However, the form-critical question is not what is crucial here. Consequently, I can be satisfied for the moment to offer my opinion that probably a number of experiences are concentrated in this narrative. To pin the story down from a form-critical perspective would risk reducing them all to a single category. (44) Nevertheless, I think it is necessary at this point to cite Gerd Theißen’s definition of a “punishment miracle” or “rule miracle of punishment.” (45)
Gerd Theißen defines a “punishment miracle” or “rule miracle of punishment” as a set of actions that express the violation of a norm and the punishment of the violation. He lists some miracles of Epidaurus and some Talmudic punishment miracles and asserts: “Whereas in the Epidaurus punishment miracles we found a ‘moderate ius talionis, . . . in the Jewish rule miracles the issue is almost always one of life or death. Breaches of the law lead to death; observance of the law preserves from death. . . . This … is a sign of great seriousness about the observance of the divine will: in the presence of God the issue is one of life or death.” (46) He correctly observes that there are no punishment miracles in the Jesus tradition. Interestingly enough, in listing the “punishment miracles” he does not consider the regulations from Qumran, which we will discuss hereafter. Within the New Testament, he counts only the story in Acts 5:1-11 as a punishment miracle “in which a condemnation is confirmed by a miracle.” (47) My opinion on this point differs: I do not think that Peter utters a “condemnation.” Instead, his statement uncovers the couple’s sin. He does not pass sentence on them. His function is not that of a judge, but rather that of a legal representative of the community of saints. He intends to uncover death-dealing actions; they must be made known. The judge is God alone. Not even the words Peter says to Sapphira in v. 9 need be understood as condemnation. The word idoy—”see”—can be a word of judgment, but it is not carried out by Peter: Peter expresses his conviction that, now that Sapphira has tried to cover her sin with a lie, God’s dealing with her will surely be similar to the fate of Ananias. (48) As I understand it, Peter’s words are anything but joyful; they are surely spoken in sorrow. There is no feeling of smug satisfaction; instead, we find a painful admission that sin continues its reign. The death of the couple can be seen as a confirmation of Peter’s successful effort to uncover the fact of sin committed, but not as a punitive action carried out by him. If we read Peter’s words as “condemnation,” we would have to draw the logical conclusion that, practically speaking, he sentences the couple to death, or at least to punishment. Ernst Haenchen (49) does express this conclusion in all its untheological radicalism: Peter “wants to kill—and succeeds. ‘ I can in no way share these or similar ideas.(50) It is not the words Peter (as a sentence of punishment) that kill, but the sinful deed that is revealed to the community. Its consequence is a total, radical exclusion from the community. The revelation of the sin merely brings to a conclusion the self-destruction that is already inherent within it.
We must mention here, in agreement with G. Schille, that this story of Sapphira and Ananias was necessarily subjected to “the sharpest criticism from liberal exegesis at the turn of the century—a sign of its fundamentally bourgeois character,” (51) precisely because it supposed that Peter had issued a death sentence on the pair. That interpretation found it difficult to consider the horrible, death-dealing power of sin in connection with attitudes toward money and property.
For example, Jürgen Roloff says that in this story there is an echo of a “rigorism . . . that is scarcely compatible with the spirit of Jesus and that, consequently, did not find a following even when church discipline [!] reached a fuller development within early Christianity.”(52) He then continues by saying that the church must “go on living with sin and hypocrisy.” My interpretation does not exclude the possibility that sin’s death-dealing reign of terror continues, or tries to persist, even within the holy community. But that does not mean that we must simply resign ourselves to observing sin and hypocrisy without offering any criticism or resistance. And we can only talk of “rigorism” if we see the cause of death, of radical exclusion from the community, in the agency of Peter. But in doing that, we turn away from the deadly consequences of sin itself. Then we criticize a supposed action of Petei; but not the sin itself that is so rigorously disclosed. Incidentally, I also believe that this story cannot find a “following” in a bourgeois world because our hearts are not even divided when it comes to our dealings with money and possessions. Our hearts normally give the preference to property, and a liberated and liberating way of dealing with property is not at all, or scarcely ever, attempted.
Exclusion from the community of the saints (Acts 5:1-11) was, in the society of the time, not the only possible exclusion from a religious community, but probably it was the most radical. If we consider the intellectual-historical context it is important to observe that the Essene community in Qumran had specific rules for intimate common life, but also that they prescribed punishments for violation of those rules. On the one hand we read in 1QS 1:11-12, that all who enter the community should “bring their knowledge and their strength and their property into the community of God,” but also in 1QS 6:24-25: “If a man is found among them who makes false statements regarding property, contrary to his own knowledge, he is to be put out from the purity of the many for a year, and he is to be punished with [the withdrawal of] a quarter of his food ration.” This punishment is possible because a man is elected as overseer or manager, and not only is the property of those who enter the community turned over to him, but he also “maintains supervision over the income of the many” (1QS 6:20; cf. Josephus, Bell. 2 123). The overseer of the community is, according to 1QS 3:13ff., filled with the Holy Spirit; he knows the ordinances and can distinguish between the spirits of truth and falsehood. The punishment prescribed for a violation of the rules is a temporary exclusion from the community. According to Josephus, (53) this exclusion can also result in death, because the members of the community are bound by oath, for example, not to accept food from outsiders. Hence exclusion from Qumran could also mean starvation leading to death, if the person is not received back into the community before the conclusion of the punishment.
Ananias and Sapphira, by their own deed, distanced themselves from the community that lived in unanimity, from the “collective person,” and thereby—because, in addition, the collective person was stronger than the two of them—they, as individualists, were destroyed. Carsten Colpe is right in saying: “Peter spoke no sentence and performed no miracle of punishment; he did not utter an excommunication or execute a first example of church discipline.” (54) For him, Peter exercises the function of excluding Ananias from the community. The fact that this exclusion could lead to death does not justify us in regarding it as a punishment miracle.
To return to the text: the radical consequence of the couple’s sinful deed is the death of both of them. First they are questioned about their action by Peter, one at a time. This can mean that all men and women are called to account for their deeds. Sapphira is questioned second. Three hours have passed since the scene with Ananias. Sapphira knows nothing about what had happened to him. She comes to the place where Ananias had been questioned. It is the place of the community assembly, where they worship together and assemble at the hours of prayer. We need not speculate about what those present are doing there and why Sapphira comes to that place. (55) The process of questioning is similar for Ananias and Sapphira, but there are some differences. Although Peter does not ask Ananias any question that requires a specific answer, Sapphira is addressed directly. Moreover, unlike Ananias, Sapphira has something to say. She is allowed to speak two words, and it is those words that reveal her complicity.
It seems useless to speculate whether Peter’s question (v. 8) is meant to give Sapphira a last chance for repentance. (56) I do not know whether it is within the scope of this text to give anyone the chance to distance himself or herself from an action “after the fact.”(57) The majority of exegetes interpret Sapphira’s answer as a lie, whether they consider she had been given a second chance or not. This, they say, is her sin. (58) But seldom do they clearly explain in what this sin or lie consists. The emphasis is normally laid on lying to the apostle. (59) Thus Sapphira’s sin is given a certain moral content; to put it another way, it is “moralized.” The result is that, as I will describe later; the anti-patriarchal power within the statement of the text is silenced.
The text itself does not literally say that Sapphira lied. Nor is it expressly said that Sapphira and Ananias sinned. Their actions are to be understood from the context as sinful. Twice (but not in connection with the answer to the question) the text speaks of lying: in v. 3c and v. 4c. Ananias lies to the Holy Spirit, or to God—not to human beings— by keeping back a part of the proceeds of the sale. That is the sin of Ananias. But what is Sapphira’s?
If the sum Peter mentions in v. 8 refers only to the amount of money that Ananias had laid at his feet, Sapphira’s answer is untruthful. (60) In that case, she is lying to Peter. But that is not the sin that makes her liable to death. Her real guilt consists in her having been complicit in the action of her husband, which deserved punishment, and in trying to cover up both his action and her complicity by lying. Her true sin lies in her having played the role of accomplice without offering any resistance. Her genuine guilt is that she agreed with her husband, that she did not attempt to counteract in any way the deed she knew was taking place. Sapphira and Ananias had the opportunity to live in a non-patriarchal marriage (1 Cor. 7:29). Not only could Ananias have lived as if he had no wife, but Sapphira could also have lived as if she had no husband: For the statement in 1 Cor. 7:29 means that husband and wife are no longer to exercise power over one another by force. But Sapphira inserts herself, or rather reinserts herself, into a patriarchal marriage. She offers no resistance to her husband’s decisions. Here, then, we have an example of how patriarchal marriage is an obstacle not only to the development of independent human personality, but also to the development of community life. The opportunity for a liberated life is rejected as both of the partners make themselves liable to death through their patriarchal act.
Luise Schottroff, in a study of the Pauline concept of sin, has clearly demonstrated that sin is a power that governs everyone. (61) That power can become concrete in sinful actions, but what is said about sin is conceived in a context of power relationships. Sin is the ruler of the world. In saying this, Paul was thinking of “governance within the dimensions of the imperium Romanum.” (62) Its rule appears like that of a slaveholder: people are its instruments. This rule can express itself as demonic power: those possessed are alienated from themselves. All three levels of domination belong together and cannot be sharply distinguished. Thus sin is a “comprehensive reign of terror.” (63) Dorothee Sölle develops this insight from the New Testament systematically, asserting that sin, thus understood, is a state or condition (64) into which we are born and in which we live, independently of our own decisions. This reign of terror consists of two elements: “One … is fate, inheritance, involvement, social compulsion, the power of sin (the objective element)—and the subjective element is my will in this, the involvement of my own action, my freedom, my decision.” (65)
The subjective response, which can also be understood as a decision to stand against this reign of terror, is not only possible; it is demanded. Christians “find themselves on the offensive” when they try “to make a liberated life in the community of the body of Christ a present reality.” (66) They take a stand against the destructive rule of sin that is tangible in unjust human structures. They attempt to build a new life for everyone.
But even the community of the saints is not a place that is free from sin’s reign of terror. Satan, the personification of sin, is a constant and enduring threat. He neglects no opportunity to express his power. (67) The story of Sapphira and Ananias testifies that even within the community of the saints the power of sin that rules over all of us is not yet entirely conquered. The subjective moment that assents to sin—Ananias’s and Sapphira’s decision—gives a visage to the objective side: the concealment of common property, which requires continually repeated lies in order to remain hidden and to continue its existence.
The author warns not only individual Christians against such a way of dealing with the foundations of the existence of a community of solidarity, but also the church as a whole. It is no accident that it is in this very context that the word ecclêsia is used for the first time in Acts. The word means—and this is Paul’s vision also (1 Cor. 15:9; Gal. 1 ;13))—both the individual community and also Christians generally: The individual congregation, in his usage, represents the church as a whole.” (68) Hence this narrative is aimed at “the whole church and all who hear of these things” (v. 11), and it demands of its hearers and readers an attitude absolutely contrary to that of Ananias and Sapphira.
The text, as we have already emphasized more than once, reports that sin’s reign of terror continues even within the circle of the saints, and that the wages of sin are here made concrete: death. One further aspect needs to be highlighted, if we are to do justice to the text and to the hope of many, even within the community itself. Sapphira and Ananias are buried. The community pays them a last service, a final work of love. (69) It does a deed of love for those who betrayed it. Something of ecclesiological and theological relevance is retained in this act of burial. First of all, the community does not completely exclude this couple. If it had done so, it would not have buried them. Second, with their burial they are handed over, or entrusted, to the final judgment of God. Their bones are not allowed to lie unburied, but are gathered together beneath the earth. Their eschatological resurrection remains possible, whether to salvation or damnation: the final word is left to God (Acts 2:29; Matt. 14:12; 1 Cor. 5:5) (70)
In summary we may say: this couple, Ananias and Sapphira, by their sin—the concealment that in turn demanded repeated lying—became subject to death, to total exclusion from the community of the saints. It need not have happened, if Ananias had not had a divided heart and if Sapphira had not been in agreement with him. From this dividedness arose the attempt to serve two contradictory gods. Their betrayal of the community of the saints is the expression of a lie not only to the Holy Spirit who dwells in the community (Acts 1:5, 8; 2:Iff.; 4:31; 5:32, and elsewhere) but also to God. The ecclesiological interpretation of this story is intimately connected to the pneumatological and theological understanding. Both of them, Ananias and Sapphira, broke the religious covenant. Both, through their sin, became worthy of death.
And yet the text makes a distinction between the sinfulness of the two partners. The character of Ananias’s sinful deed is not the same as that of Sapphira. Although the consequences of the sin affect them both, the quality of their sinfulness is different. Ananias, and not Sapphira, had his heart filled by Satan. Ananias planned and carried out the deception. He thus lies to the Holy Spirit and to God. Sapphira, by her guilty knowledge, was complicit with her husband in testing the Holy Spirit. She sinned because she did not do anything to oppose her husband. In my opinion, the substantial difference between the sinfulness of the two consists in this: while the “deed” of Ananias is characterized by self-assertion, that of Sapphira consists in a failure to define herself. Her husband made a decision, and Sapphira went along with it. Peter’s saying in Acts 4:19 and 5:28-29 would apply to her in this instance: that it is better to obey God and not human beings. Disobedience to her husband would have meant salvation for her; and a continued life in the community of the saints. Instead, the end of the story provides a concrete example of what Paul means when he concludes his description of the entanglement of sin and death with the words: “the wages of sin is death” (Rom. 6:23)
Summary. A Look Ahead
Acts 5:1-11 presents part of the story of a married couple in the Jerusalem community of the saints and thus, at the same time, part of the story of the community itself. The story of the couple belongs in this context because its initial statement connects with the preceding statement about the customary sale of goods. This practice presupposes a system of solidarity based on a very deep internal sense of community. It is founded on faith in the one Lord, the risen Jesus Christ. This unity is sustained by the gift and the presence of the Holy Spirit. The community is holy to the Lord. Injuries to this community are injuries tothe Holy Spirit and to God’s own self. These are presuppositions that are illustrated in the actions of Ananias and Sapphira.
For me, the following insights arise from this text:
It is not accidental that Sapphira is mentioned at the beginning of the pericope alongside her husband. Her naming here corresponds to a legal demand or presumes the existence of one. It is part of the Jewish law of private property, and especially the law of marital property, that every woman, when she enters into marriage, is to be assured a kethuba from her husband in the marriage contract. That means that he promises her a specific sum of money, to be given her in case the marriage is dissolved. The husband is responsible with his entire property, whether it be great or small, for his wife’s kethuba. Therefore the wife must consent to the sale of real property. With her public consent, she renounces her right to her kethuba. Therefore Peter can say in v. 8 that both of them sold the field, and not only Ananias (as in v. 1). Verse 1 therefore tells us that Sapphira was prepared, for the sake of the community, to abandon her right to a more or less secure future.
The concealment can only be understood as such if we presume, in the case of this action, that even before the sale there had been an agreement about the surrender of the proceeds to the community. According to the concepts of the time, a portion can only be “held back” with respect to the property of another, common property, or goods that have been declared to be the property of the community. Peter explains Ananias’s action by saying that Satan had filled his heart—his organ of volition and decision. But Satan can only find room in a heart that is not completely filled by something else. This can mean that Ananias was not wholeheartedly a member of the community. Peter’s theological explanation implies that even Christians continue to be subjected to sin’s reign of terror. Sapphira knew about her husband’s guilty action, especially since it is expressly said of her that she was complicit in it.
Sapphira refused to set herself in opposition to the power of sin; this she did by functioning as a co-conspirator. She agreed with her husband, even after she had courageously renounced her kethuba. Complicity in this form is asserted in the New Testament only of this woman. It points to a system of patriarchal power that is here situated within patriarchal marriage. The husband does the action; the wife knows of it, but she does nothing to oppose this corrupt and corrupting deed. She takes her place within the patriarchal power system. In doing so, she becomes equally guilty and ultimately endangers herself as well. When there is danger to the community, the individual is also in danger.
By their sin of concealment, the couple becomes subject to death, the total exclusion from the community. The consequences of sin are the same for both of them, although they participated in the deed in different ways. Ananias’s action is based on self-assertion, while that of Sapphira is founded in a lack of self-determination.
Their sudden death attests to their wrong behavior. Death is the negation of such behavior. In this story, a norm is established for the hearers: now they know what is to be done. If we read the story from the other side, it could mean this: In this story, women are shown an opportunity for liberation from death-dealing structures. They may— indeed they must—distance themselves from any such corrupt and corrupting decisions of their husbands. They are offered an opportunity for active disobedience. They should not be condemned with their husbands. They should struggle to reverse such decisions. In this story—in contrast to different warnings heard from the church (71)—they are not commanded to submit themselves to their husbands. Instead, they should resist them when they enter into corrupt and corrupting plans.(72)
Notes
1. It is evident from their names that Sapphira and Ananias were Jews: hananah means “YHWH has mercy,” and sapirah “the beautiful one.” See Billerbeck 2:634.
2. Elisabeth Koffmahn, Doppelurkunden, esp. 104ff. The question of women’s property rights in marriage was addressed by S. Krauss in Talmudische Archäologie 2:43ff., in the section, “Die Stellung der Frau (in der Ehe)” [The Position of Women (in Marriage)]. Rachel Biale, Women and Jewish Law. An Exploration of Women’s Issues in Halakhic Sources (New York, 1984), 44ff., does not speak directly of marriage in discussing women’s property rights. She does mention the socioeconomic circumstances surrounding marriage a number of times (pp. 55, 61, 86-87) and the making of a marriage compact (kethuba), but does not investigate this question of property rights in detail. See also, on this subject, Billerbeck 2:372ff.
3. E. Koffmahn, Doppelurkunden, 11.
4. E. Koffmahn, Doppelurkunden, 29. The double documents were a very ancient form for the legal confirmation of business arrangements among the Jewish people. Their existence can be demonstrated for the seventh century B.C.E., and Jer. 32:10-15 also attests that they had been known for a long time.
5. Thus E. Koffmahn, Doppelurkunden, 28-29. This may even have been the last symbolic form of resistance, since the duplicate documents were used in Masada up to the final days: see Koffmahn, 43ff., and elsewhere.
6. E. Koffmahn, Doppelurkunden, 109-10.
7. See the examples of duplicate documents cited by E. Koffmahn, Doppelurkunden, 114ff.
8. See E. Koffmahn, Doppelurkunden, 65, 104, 106; cf. also A. Gulak, Urkundenwesen, 37, 44-45, 52ff., 60, 67, 73, who frequently emphasizes that both the wife and the husband brought a dowry into the marriage. Thus for example Gulak quotes (p. 45) from yKetubot: “It was taught: both the husband and the father set aside the dowry; but the husband does so in writing, while the (bride’s) father does so only orally.” Hence Gulak (p. 52) can speak of “mutual dowries.”
9. CP/ 144 (first century B.C.E.) attests the fact that a divorced wife received her dowry of 60 drachmas, which, in accordance with the marriage contract, she had brought with her into the marriage; CII 763 (third century C.E.) reports that a wife had a grave marker prepared for herself, her husband, her son, and her daughter out of her dowry (ek tês idias proikos). On divorce and the dowry that thereby came into the woman’s possession, see Ross S. Kraemei, ed., Maenads, Martyrs, Matrons, Monastics (Philadelphia, 1988), 88; further information also in E. Koffmahn, Doppelurkunden, 110 ff.
10. S. Krauss, Archäologie 2:43, says that slaves, real property, and movable goods could make up parts of a woman’s dowry, if the father’s means permitted.
11. Boaz Cohen, “Peculium in Jewish and Roman Law,” PAAJR 20 (1951): 135-234, at 170, asserts that the wife’s property was also controlled by her husband, and that this was meant to guarantee harmony in the marriage. For a iscussion of the question of whether a husband could sell the goods that were his wife’s property, see E. Koffmahn, Doppelurkunden, 104ff., esp. 108, with bibliography.
12.See examples and interpretation in E. Koffmahn, Doppelurkunden, 156ff.
13. Mur is the abbreviation for papyri from Wadi Murabba’at. All three are to be found in E. Koffmahn, Doppelurkunden, 116ff.
14. See E. Koffmahn, Doppelurkunden, 177.
15. See E. Koffmahn, Doppelurkunden, 185.
16. E. Koffmahn, Doppelurkunden, 179.
17. According to C. Brekelmans, “haram” THAT 1 (1984): 635-39, this passage, in the Jewish context, reflects the original usage of the concept of anathema / “ban,” and “the cultic usage of hrm . . . and the usage in the context of war were connected; in both it is a matter of the thing banned . . . belonging to YHWH, so that every offense against YHWH’s right to possession of the hrm would bring harm to the community.”
18. Josephus, Ant. 4.8.29.
19. têrein tên pistin kata ton horkon: see Titus 2:10, which concerns a similar matter (not military, but having to do with domestic administration), namely “not to pilfer, but to show complete and perfect fidelity.”
20. Polybius 10.16.6; on this, see also 6.21.
21. Xenophon, Cyropaedia 4.2.42. See also, similarly, Plutarch, Lucullus 37; also Athenaeus 6.234.
22. Diodorus Siculus, History, 5.34.3.
23. See SIG 3.993. The same content—the contractually fixed sacrifice, which it is forbidden to hold back—is also in IG 4.841.
24. Aristides, Apologia, 15.4.
25.See Herbert Preisker, kleptô” TDNT 3:754.
26. Cf. Werner Foerster, “harpazô,” TDNT 1:472-73.
27. See, for example, Luke 10:27 (= Deut. 6:5); 12:34, 45; 16:10ff.; 22:3, 31-32; John 13:2; Acts 8:21-22; 11:23-24.
28. Quotations from Johannes Behm, ‘kardia TDNT 3:605-14, at 611-12.
29. Rudolf Pesch, Die Apostelgeschichte, EKK 5/1, 2 (1986), 1:198.
30. This interpretation is shared by Pesch, Apostelgeschichte 1:199 n. 21, and Luke T. Johnson, The Literary Function of Possessions in Luke-Acts, SBLDS 39 (Atlanta, 1977), 207-8. For the meaning and use of epexegetical kai, see BDR §442,9.
31. Johnson, Function, 207: “It is not just the unity of a human assembly which is threatened by conspiracy, but the Spirit of God Himself who creates that unity. An offense against the unity is therefore an offense against God.”
32. For this interpretation, see Christian Maurer, prassô TDNT 6:632- 44, at 639—40.
33. See, for example, Ernst Haenchen, Acts, 237; G. Schille, Apostelgeschichte, 149; in the same vein also J. Roloff, Apostelgeschichte, 94.
34. For discussion of “community of goods,” see, for example, L. Schottroff and W. Stegemann, Jesus, 116-20; B. H. Mönning, Die Darstellung des urchris- tlichen Kommunismus nach der Apostelgeschichte des Lukas, diss. (Göttingen, 1978), esp. 42ff.; W. Schrage, The Ethics of the New Testament, 126-28; Brakemeier, Der “Sozialismus” der Urchristenheit (Göttingen, 1988), 10ff., who in turn refer to other works.
35. R. Pesch, Apostelgeschichte 1:199.
36. That such a departure was not only possible, but really happened, is clear from Pliny, Epistulae 10.96.
37. J. Jeremias, Jerusalem 1/2, 46 n. 4, where he also asserts that “Ananias’s fault is not in his lie, but in the keeping back of the property dedicated to God.” The study by B. H. Monning, Darstellung, esp. 65ff. denies this. According to Mönning, Ananias and Sapphira’s sin is this: “the sin of the pair (pragma; v. 4b) [consists] in their untrue statements regarding the proceeds acquired by the sale of their field, and thus in lying to the Spirit” (p. 66). He further asserts on p. 68: “the pair’s offense does not consist in not having given the apostles the full proceeds from the sale, but in the secret retention of part of it.” It is interesting to observe that Mönning does not inquire at all about why the pair needed to lie, if not to conceal the offense (keeping back = “secret retention of part” of the money). He fails to observe the interrelation of the actions.
38. See, for example, 1 Cor. 7:29; differently Col. 3:18. For more detail, see pp. 16-23.
39. For a feminist discussion of shared responsibility, see especially Christina Thürmer-Rohr, Vagabundinnen: feministische Essays (Berlin, 1987), 38ff.
40. See, e.g., R. Pesch,Apostelgeschichte 1:202-3; H. Baltensweiler; “Wunder und Glaube im Neuen Testament,” ThZ 23 (1967):255.
41.J. Roloff, Apostelgeschichte, 93; J. Comblin, Atos dos Apóstolos, 1:132.
42. R. Pesch, Apostelgeschichte 1:203.
43.See the summary of research in E. Haenchen, Acts, 239-41.
44. R. Pesch deserves commendation for honoring the many-sidedness of the narrative in his commentary.
45. G. Theißen, The Miracle Stories of the Early Christian Tradition, 109-10.
46. Ibid., 110.
47. Ibid., 109.
48. The expression “look, the feet of those who have buried . . .” was used in that period to describe the imminent approach of death to the person addressed. See Billerbeck 2:634.
49. E. Haenchen, Acts, 239.
50. If Peter’s behavior is understood that way, then, as I have indicated above, we assign to him an authority that may well have been claimed by later popes. Then it is even possible, by means of a later exegesis oriented to church hieriarchy, to use this narrative as the basis for a punitive canon law for those who assert themselves against the papal authority. In this light,
Michel Clevenot’s criticism of the aspiring spiritual leadership personified in Peter (Von Jerusalem nach Rom. Geschichte des Christentums im I. Jahrhundert [Fribourg, 1987], is understandable but inappropriate for this text. First of all, Ananias did not seek merely to deceive the leadership of the community, but the community of saints as a whole; second, Peter’s action here is not a “religious fanaticism that propagates death in the name of God,” but the uncovering of a socio-religious sin that in this case has radical consequences not because of the presence of Peter, but because of the presence of God in the community.
51. G. Schille, Apostelgeschichte, 155.
52. Jürgen Roloff, Apostelgeschichte, 96.
53. Josephus, Bell. 2.143.
54. Carsten Colpe, “Die älteste judenchristliche Gemeinde,” 70.
55. According to Hans Conzelmann, Acts, 38, “the congregation seems to be always in session.” G. Schille, Apostelgeschichte, 150, refers to possible holy days or
the hours of prayer, “since it appears that prayers were held every three hours. Whether the community is always gathered together (and even in consultation) or whether it has just gathered (although in any case there has been a burial in the meantime) — of this, not a word is said.” This is his summary of the commentators’ discussion about the passage of three hours (v. 7).
56. There has been widespread discussion of the positive and negative possibilities. Let me mention just a few examples. The majority of exegetes answer in the negative: thus E. Haenchen, Acts, 238; G. Schille, Apostelgeschichte, 150; J. Comblin, Atos, 133. I. H. Marshall, Acts, 110, says that there was apparently no chance for repentance, but on p. 113 he writes: “Sapphira is given the opportunity to tell the truth and thus to show some sign of repentance from her former attitude.” R. Pesch, Apostelgeschichte 1:200-201, interprets Peter’s question in v. 8 as giving Sapphira another chance “to tell the truth and, in spite of her complicity (2), to distance herself from her husband’s behavior—at least after the fact—and instead of ‘agreeing with’ him (9b) to become one with the community again (4:32).”
57. See R. Pesch’s remarks cited in the previous note.
58. R. Knopf, “Apostelgeschichte,” 21; E. Haenchen, Acts, 238-39; G. Schille, Apostelgeschichte, 150; J. Comblin, Atos, 134; H. W. Beyer, Apostelgeschichte, 38;Pesch, Apostelgeschichte 1:195-96, 201.
59. See, for example, H. W. Beyer, Apostelgeschichte, 38: “Certainly it is not, for example, the retention of part of the proceeds from the sale of the land that is the sin, . . . but the lie given to the apostles, and the hypocrisy.” R. Pesch differs (Apostelgeschichte, 201), emphasizing that Sapphira’s untruth in v. 8 “covers up for the wicked behavior of her husband and repeats the lie that is implicit in his action.” In this opinion, Pesch distances himself from the dominant interpretation of this text.
60. The majority of commentators interpret tosoytou as meaning the money presented by Ananias: R. Knopf, “Apostelgeschichte,” 21; J. Roloff, Apostelgeschichte, 94-95; E. Haenchen, Acts, 239; R. Pesch, Apostelgeschichte 1:201; only I. H. Marshall differs (Acts, 113): “In fact the figure named by Peter in verse 8 might be the actual amount of the sale, in which case Sapphira’s reply would be a confession.” Unfortunately, he does not pursue the idea of this confession and its possible consequences. Would Peter not have had to act differently if this were a confession of sin, and thereby necessarily also an expression of readiness to repent? For the use of tosoytou as a genitivum pretii, see BDR §179, 1, and Jens-Uwe Schmidt, Valenzorientierte Syntax des Griechischen, 51.
61. L. Schottroff, “Schreckensherrschaft,” 57ff.
62. Ibid., 60.
63. Ibid., 63.
64. Dorothee Sölle, Thinking About God, 54.
65. Ibid., 56. For more on “women’s sin” and the way it is understood in the dominant currents of exegesis, see L. Schottroff, “Befreite Eva,” esp. 56ff., 79ff.; and W. Deifelt, “Justificação,” 16ff., both of whom refer to additional feminist literature in confrontation with the dominant theology.
66. Luise Schottroff, “Schreckensherrschaft,” 71.
67. Rom. 7:8ff. See the interpretation and bibliography in Schottroff, “Schreckensherrschaft,” 62.
68J. Becker, “Paulus und seine Gemeinden,” 124 (= “Paul and his Churches,” 163).
69. On this, see my remarks on the works of the disciple Tabitha on pp. 36- 41 below.
70. The religious significance of burial is indicated also by the practices of the burial societies that maintained their own communal burying grounds and were responsible for the interment of their members because they believed that this would give them a share in the future life. On this, see for example Heinrici, “Die Christengemeinde Korinths und die religiösen Genossen schaften der Griechen,” 482; J. Becker, “Paulus,” 116; E. Schüssler Fiorenza, In Memory of Her, 175-204.
71. See, for example, Titus 2:5; 1 Pet. 3:1; Col. 3:18; Eph. 5:22ff
72. As Schleiermacher said in his Catechism of Reason for Noble Women, “You shall not bear false witness for men, you shall not gloss over their barbarism in word and deed.” Quoted from Dorothee Sölle, Thinking About God, 67.